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STATUTORY PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The general review provisions of section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)1 entitle any person adversely affected by agency
action to obtain judicial review of the action. Thus, even though the
particular statute under which the challenged agency activity has been
conducted does not itself specify' that review shall be available, an ag-
grieved party may turn to the APA for relief.3 Where the statute,
however, is one which, instead of simply failing to address the question,
actually "preclude[s] judicial review" within the meaning of section
10,4 the APA review provisions afford no access to the courts.
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
K. DAVIS, ADvdnShATIVE LAW TnAnsE (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis,
TREATISE].
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). Section 702 provides: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Section
703 provides: "The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence
or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action. . . in a court of competent
jurisdiction." Section 704 provides: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review."
2. Statutes creating federal administrative agendies may specifically provide that
persons adversely affected by such agencies' decisions may seek review by the judiciary.
See, e.g., Civil Service Commission Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970); Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (1970); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970); Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970); Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ff(c) (1970).
3. "One who seeks review in absence of specific statutory provision for review
normally seeks it under the APA." K. DAvis, TREATISE § 28.05, at 942 (Supp.
1970); see, e.g., Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Medicare Act does not provide for review but APA does give right of review,
absent specific bar); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258-60 (5th Cir.
1975) (although not specifically provided for by statute or regulations, judicial review of
Defense Department contract award may be had by unsuccessful bidder under APA);
Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (although
Railway Labor Act does not specifically provide for review of National Mediation Board
jurisdictional determination, the APA permits such review). Before review of an agency
decision is available, various preliminary requirements must be satisfied, including
standing, finality, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. See generally K. DAvis,
ADmam'NsTATrmV LAW TEXr § 28.01 (3d ed. 1972).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). 'This chapter applies, according to the provisions
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The scope of this limitation on judicial review under the APA has
been a matter of controversy. A similar common law doctrine of stat-
utory preclusion existed prior to the enactment of the APA.5  At that
time, the courts felt free to deny such review whenever it was discerned
that Congress, in a particular agency enabling act, intended no such
review. The congressional intent was divined through the traditional
process of judicial construction: if a court decided that the purpose
or legislative history of a less than explicit statute revealed a congres-
thereof, except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." Id. This introductory clause modifies
the entire chapter governing judicial review, id. § 701-06, and is thus a limitation on the
review which the section would otherwise make available. One limitation, the unavaila-
bility of review because of the "committed to agency discretion" clause, has been the
subject of much litigation, see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971), and is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally K. DAVIs,
TExT, supra note 3, § 28.05; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE
L.J 965 (1969).
Standing to seek review is a concept which must be distinguished from reviewability.
In Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), the Court defined "standing" in terms of a two-part test. First, the com-
plainant must allege "that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise." Id. at 152. Second, "the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153.
Reviewability presumes that the standing prerequisite has been satisfied and then
adds the element of the court's power to judge a certain administrative decision.
Correspondingly, "unreviewable" administrative actions are those which will not be
judicially scrutinized, despite the fulfillment of all prerequisites such as standing and
finality, either because Congress has cut off the court's power to review or because the
courts deem the issue "inappropriate for judicial determination." K. DAviS, TEXT, supra
note 3, § 28.01, at 508.
Even "unreviewable" administrative action may be judicially reviewed under excep-
tional circumstances, such as where there has been a clear departure from the agency's
statutory authority. See Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1973) (order of
Comptroller of Currency reviewable because outside his statutory authority, despite 12
U.S.C. § 1818(i)'s withdrawal of review). In light of such limitations, this Note will use
the term "unreviewable" to designate administrative agency actions which are not
scrutinized by the judiciary, in spite of the conceded fulfillment of all prerequisites such
as standing and exhaustion of all administrative remedies, unless abuse of jurisdiction is
involved.
It should be noted that the limitations on reviewabiity under the APA are phrased
to allow for pro tanto nonreviewability. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). As originally en-
acted, the APA was phrased "except so far as statutes preclude review. .. ." Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946). Thus, a statute may preclude
review of some decisious by an agency, or may preclude review by certain plaintiffs. As
Professor Davis noted: "The [APA] is thus carefully framed to avoid the all-or-none
fallacy; the Act recognizes that the previous law often cut off review to some extent
without cutting it off altogether, and the words 'so far as' left the law as it was." 4 K.
DAvis, TRPX XsE § 28.08, at 33-34. See also Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159, 169 n.2 (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring).
5. See notes 8-18 infra and accompanying text.
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sional intent to prohibit or limit review, review was unavailable just as
though the statute so declared on its face.
The enactment of the APA, however, apparently brought with it
a narrowing of this exception to judicial review.' Several Supreme
Court decisions indicate that the APA created a presumption in favor
of reviewability, and further that agency decisions will be held unre-
viewable only where a statute precludes such review "upon its face."7
Yet other Court statements and lower court decisions suggest that this
apparent narrowing of unreviewability may represent no more than
misleading dicta.
This Note examines the preclusion-by-statute doctrine under the
APA, inquiring first into the historical development of the doctrine,
and then focusing on two principal questions: first, whether judicial
review under the APA may be precluded by statute only if the statute
limits or prohibits review on its face, and, second, if an express pre-
clusion is not required, what sort of showing is necessary to overcome
the presumption of reviewability said to be created by the APA.
THE DOCTRINE OF "PRECLUSION BY STATUTE" UNDER THE APA
Prior to enactment of the APA in 1946, the availability of judi-
cial review, where not specifically enumerated by an agency statute,
was governed by what has been termed a "common law of judicial re-
view."8 Under this early approach, the reviewing court was required
to determine, prior to hearing the merits, whether Congress had in-
tended to authorize judicial review of the particular administrative ac-
tion in question." The congressional intent, in turn, was divined
through the traditional process of judicial construction. In addition to
the obvious need to look at the language of the statute, the valid indi-
cia considered by the judiciary in making this determination included
6. See notes 25-34 infra and accompanying text.
7. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
156-57 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1946) (both
cases quoting H.R. RP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946)).
8. See 4 K. DAvis, TREATsE § 28.07; Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71
HA&v. L. Rnv. 401, 410 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297, 301 (1943) ("constitutional questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how the
rights which it creates shall be enforced," and Congress in enacting the Railway Labor
Act did not intend judicial review of certain National Mediation Board decisions);
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1938) (intent of Congress was central
consideration in decision that Urgent Deficiencies Act did not allow judicial review of
certain order by ICC). For a more detailed discussion of Switchmen's Union, see text
accompanying notes 14-20 infra.
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the pattern of the statutory scheme,10 the purpose of the statute," and
legislative history of the statute."2 Thus, if the court decided, for ex-
ample, that the purpose or legislative history behind a statute not ex-
pressly addressing the question of judicial review revealed a congres-
sional intent to prohibit or limit such review, the statute was construed
as precluding review as effectively as if it so declared on its face.' 3
In the leading pre-APA decision of Switchmen's Union of North
America v. National Mediation Board,'4 the Supreme Court held that
a decision of the National Mediation Board to certify a certain union
to represent railway men under the Railway Labor Act 5 was not judi-
cially reviewable, despite the fact that the statute itself did not explicitly
forbid review of such decisions. The Court's holding turned on an in-
terpretation of the Railway Labor Act taken as a whole' 6 and the legis-
lative history of the statute, including committee hearings and com-
ments of the statute's sponsor.' 7  Switchmen's Union typifies the pre-
APA approach to reviewability: the congressional intent to withhold
review was derived through the orthodox process of statutory construc-
tion.1 3
10. See Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297,
304-00 (1943).
11. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 233 (1938) (congressional purpose
in enacting Urgent Deficiencies Act indicated that Act did not authorize judicial review
of certain ICC orders).
12, See Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297,
301 (1943) ("Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the type of
problem involved and the history of the statute in question become highly relevant in
determining whether judicial review may be nonetheless supplied.").
13. See id. at 302, 305-06.
14. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
15. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(Ninth) (1970). The statute provides:
If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the
representatives of such employees . . . it shall be the duty of the'Mediation
Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute
and to certify to both parties . . . the name or names of the individuals or
organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the em-
ployees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier... . In
such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret
ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method
of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representa-
tives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the em-
ployees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier.
In the conduct of any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board
shall designate who may participate in the election and establish the rules to
govern the election, or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who
after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may partici-
pate in the election. Id.
16. See 320 U.S. at 305-06.
17. See id. at 302-03.
18. See K. DAwS, TEXT, supra note 3, § 28.04, at 513 (discussing Switchmen's
Union).
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Whether the APA merely codified the existing "common law" of
reviewability or was intended by Congress to change the law has been
the subject of some debate. One position is that the Switchmen's
Union approach was continued under the APA, so that judicial review
should be precluded whenever a statute is judicially interpreted so to
preclude it, whether that interpretation rest on explicit language, legis-
lative history, or other factors. 9 A contrary argument is that the APA
created a presumption that review is available and that only an explicit
statutory preclusion of review should overcome that presumption.20
Early Supreme Court decisions applying the APA seem to be in
accord with the first position. Ludecke v. Watkins2 held that the
Alien Enemy Act22 precluded judicial review of a wartime alien depor-
tation order. In fact, the Act contained no specific language either au-
thorizing or forbidding judicial review of such deportation orders. The
Court's finding of unreviewability turned on its observation that "con-
trolling contemporaneous [judicial] construction" had precluded re-
view, and that "every judge before whom the question has since come
has held that the statute barred judicial review."2 3  Ludecke thus sug-
gests that a statute, neutral on its face toward reviewability, could be
one which, through judicial interpretation, precludes review. 24
19. See 4 K. DAvIs, TREATISE § 28.08, at 37, 41.
20. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HAv. L. REv. 769, 793 (1958). See
also W. GELLHPoN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW CASES A" COMMENTS 218-20 (6th
ed. 1974) (suggesting that preclusion of judicial review will rarely be implied from a
statute); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMNmTRATVE AcrioN 374 (1965).
21. 335 U.S. 160 (1948). The Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1970), empowers
the President to determine and promulgate the restraints to be placed on aliens of hostile
countries. Pursuant to executive order during World War II, Ludecke was ordered
deported as a German alien. The Court held that the Alien Enemy Act precludes review
by the courts of the deportation decision by the President. 335 U.S. at 163-64.
22. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1970). The statute provides:
Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any
foreign nation ... all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile
nation or government . . . who shall be within the United States and not
actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured,
and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized in any such event,
by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be
observed on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so
liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject
and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted,
and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside
within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to estab-
lish any other regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for
the public safety.
23. 335 U.S. at 164-65.
24. This proposition was reinforced by Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
Petitioner there sought review of a deportation order issued by the Attorney General
under the Immigration Act of 1917. While the Court admitted that the "finality"
language of the statute was insufficient of itself to bar review, id. at 233, it found that
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In later cases, however, the Supreme Court began with increasing
frequency to suggest that statutory preclusion must be explicit. In the
1967 case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,25 drug manufacturers
sought judicial review of regulations on drug labeling issued under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.26 The Government attempted
to block review, asserting that the Act precluded it by implication.27
In rejecting this argument and holding that the Act did not preclude
such an action for judicial review,28 the Court first declared that the
APA "embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one [suit-
ably aggrieved by agency action] so long as no statute precludes such
relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion
.... ,2. Specifically addressing the statutory preclusion question, the
Court then quoted, in a footnote, from material in the APA's legislative
background which it thought "elucidated" the congressional intent be-
hind the provision: "To preclude judicial review under this bill a stat-
ute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it."301
Three years later, in Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 1 a decision concerned primarily with the
standing requirement, the Supreme Court once again dealt with the
question of statutory preclusion of judicial review. The Comptroller
of the Currency had issued a ruling permitting national banks to pro-
vide data processing services. A group of vendors of such equipment
the statute did preclude review because -the requisite congressional intent was shown by
legislative and judicial history. See id. at 233-35. When Heikkila was decided, the
statute read in part: "In every case where any person is ordered deported from the
United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of
the Attorney General shall be final." Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat.
889, as amended 54 Stat. 1238, formerly codified 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946), repealed
Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403 (a) (13), 66 Stat. 279.
25. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
27. The Government argued that since the Act specifically enumerated review
procedures for certain categories of regulations, Congress by implication intended no
review of all other regulations. The labeling regulation involved in the case was outside
the categories for which review was provided by the Act. 387 U.S. at 141. The
Court specifically rejected the expressio unius basis for preclusion of judicial review,
stating that "It]he mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to
support an implication of exclusion as to others." Id., quoting L. JAE, supra note
20, at 357.
28. 387 U.S. at 148.
29. Id. at 140.
30. Id. at 140 & n.2, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946)
emphasis added).
31. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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sought judicial review of the ruling since it reduced their own business
opportunities. After finding the standing requirement satisfied, the
Court went on to hold that review of the Comptroller's ruling was not
precluded by any "relevant" statute. Implicit in the decision is the
Court's recognition of the presumption favoring judicial review men-
tioned in Abbott Laboratories.3 3 Moreover, the Data Processing opin-
ion elevated the statement quoted in Abbott Laboratories-that preclu-
sion of review must appear on the face of a statute-from mere foot-
note status to textual discussion, 34 suggesting increased emphasis of the
point.
From the treatment given the issue of limitation or preclusion of
judicial review by statute in the Abbott Laboratories and Data Process-
ing decisions, one might conclude that the APA mandates a presump-
tion that judicial review of agency action is available, and that the pre-
sumption will not be overcome except by a showing that some other
statute "upon its face" clearly reveals a congressional intent to bar such
judicial review. These tentative conclusions, however, require a more
thorough examination.
THE "UPON ITS FACE" REQUIREMENT FOR
STATUTORY PRECLUSION
Despite the pronouncements of Abbott Laboratories and Data
Processing that a statute will bar judicial review only when it expresses
such a prohibition "upon its face," the weight of judicial authority does
not support such a proposition. Since Abbott Laboratories, the federal
courts have consistently stated that the APA does provide a "presump-
tion" in favor of judicial review," but whatever may be the nature and
32. Id. at 157. The "relevant" statutes were the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1864 (1970), and -the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). With little
elaboration, the opinion declares: "We find no evidence that Congress in either [Act]
sought to preclude judicial review of administrative rulings by the Comptroller ..
397 U.S. at 157.
33. In addressing the reviewability question, the Court began by questioning "wheth-
er judicial review. . . has been precluded." 397 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). Thus,
it apparently did not think it necessary even to address as a separate stage the availability
of review, indicating that it presumed review was in fact available unless affirmatively
precluded.
34. Id.
35. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) ("Indeed, judicial review of
such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be
demonstrated."). See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) ("ft]he
strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of [the
Sec. of Labor's] decision"); Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 1975) ("there
is a basic presumption of judicial review" for those aggrieved by agency action); Roth-
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strength of this presumption,3" it is now clear that review may be pre-
cluded by a statute even in the absence of any limitation on the face
of the statute itself. 7
There is but slender support in the legislative history of the APA
for the view that a statute may bar judicial review only when it in terms
addresses the issue or bears language negativing such review on its
face. The language of the House Judiciary Committee, 8 although re-
peatedly accepted by the Supreme Court as being the definitive expres-
sion of congressional intent in the APA, is not representative of the
APA's legislative history.39 The pre-APA law, as typified by the
Switchmen's Union"0 decision, did not require statutory prohibition of
judicial review to be express. And the weight of the legislative state-
ments surrounding the APA's enactment, aside from the one exception
already noted,"' shows no congressional inclination to overturn the law
of Switchmen's Union and to impose a strict requirement of express
preclusion.
In initial deliberations on the APA, for example, the Senate com-
mittee stressed that the introductory limitations42 on judicial review
were merely a statement of existing law on the preclusion of judicial
review.43  In the House committee hearings, a proponent of the bill
stated that he had no intent to alter the existing "principles of re-
view."'44  In response to congressional solicitation of his opinion, the
Attorney General expressed the view that the bill would, so far as it
related to the preclusion of judicial review, declare the existing law.
man v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1975) (APA "provides jurisdiction
for review of agency action . . . unless such jurisdiction is otherwise barred"); Hayes
Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 1975) ("there is virtually a pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review. . . unless a contrary purpose is fairly discernible
in the statutory scheme"); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093,
1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[pireclusion of judicial review is not lightly to be inferred [and]
requires a showing of clear evidence of legislative intent").
36. This issue is discussed at text accompanying notes 66-96 infra.
37. See Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For
a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 53-58 infra.
38. Quoted in text accompanying note 30 supra.
39. See generally Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 431
(1954).
40. 320 U.S. 297 (1943). See text accompanying notes 14-1-8 supra.
41. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946) (quoted in text
accompanying note 30 supra).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970) (quoted in note 4 supra).
43. "The introductory exceptions state the two present general or basic situations in
which judicial review is precluded .... " S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36
(1946) (emphasis added).'
44. Id. at 84 (remarks of Congressman McFarland).
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He cited as an example of that law the Switchmen's Union decision.45
It does not appear from the legislative history that the Senate or House
committees ever took issue with the Attorney General's interpretation
of the bill. Thus, the "upon its face" language twice quoted by the
Supreme Court4 seems misrepresentative of -the contemporaneous un-
derstanding of the Congress as to the effect of the APA's enactment
on reviewability.
In both Supreme Court decisions citing the proposition that pre-
clusion of review must appear on the face of a statute, the reference
is dictum.47 Moreover, as already discussed, such dicta run directly
contrary to earlier holdings of the Court.48  And in Barlow v. Collins,49
decided on the same day as Data Processing, the Court observed that
preclusion of judicial review might be found in "implied terms,""° fur-
ther weakening the Data Processing suggestion that preclusion must be
found on the face of the statute.
When faced directly with the problem, the lower federal courts
have not hesitated to ignore the "upon its face" dicta. Thus, where
the circuit courts have been forced to deal with statutes which contain
no express prohibition of review, 51 several have ignored such dicta and
45. "Section 10: This section, in general, declares the existing law concerning
judicial review .... A statute may in terms preclude judicial review or be interpreted
as manifesting a congressional intention to preclude judicial review. Examples of such
interpretation are: Switchmen's Union. . . ." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
229-30 (1946) (advisory opinion of Attorney General of the United States).
46. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
156 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 n.2 (1967).
47. In Abbott Laboratories, the Court observed that "[t]here is no evidence at all
that members of Congress meant to preclude... judicial relief," and so had no need to
decide if such evidence appearing other than on the face of the statute was relevant to
the inquiry. See 387 U.S. at 142. Data Processing also was a case where no evidence of
congressional intent to preclude review was shown, so it was not necessary for the Court
to decide whether evidence not apparent from the face of the statute itself would be
ignored. See 397 U.S. at 157.
48. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra. Professor Davis, after discussing the
conflict between the Court's language in Data Processing and its holdings, concludes: "A
flat assertion that the dictum in Data Processing is not the law is not too strong." 4 K.
DAvis, TRElsE § 28.08, at 947 (Supp. 1970).
49. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
50. Id. at 165. Tenant farmers sought judicial review of certain Agriculture
Department regulations concerning land diversion payments. In holding that the farm-
ers did have standing and that no statute precluded such judicial review, the Court stated
that it must determine "if Congress has in express or implied terms precluded judicial
review... ." Id. (emphasis added).
51. While some agency organic statutes do expressly preclude review, others are
much less clear. Among statutes carrying specific preclusion language are those limiting
review except in a specified manner and those prohibiting review altogether. In the
latter category are 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) (no court has power to review certain
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inferred a preclusion of review.52  A recent example is the decision
of the District of Columbia Circuit in Consumer Federation of America
v. FTC,53 which held that the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA) precludes review of FTC refusals to order corrective advertis-
ing for any persons not subject to cease and desist orders.55 Since the
FTCA is on its face wholly neutral toward the availability of review
for persons outside the category of those "subject to cease and desist
orders," 56 the holding that the Act precludes review within the mean-
ing of the APA57 obviously does not conform to the dicta of Abbott
Laboratories and Data Processing. Accordingly, Consumer Federation
plainly rejects the proposition that statutory preclusion of judicial re-
view must be express.58
Veterans Administration decisions on claims) and 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1970) (no court
has power to review administrative denials of claims under Federal Employees' Compen-
sation Act). Restrictions in the former category include prohibition of review except in
a certain forum. See UMC Indus., Inc. v. Seaborg, 439 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1971)
(decisions of Board of Patent Interferences to award patent to Atomic Energy Commis-
sion unreviewable in district court because 42 U.S.C. § 2182 specifies that appeal lies to
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (petition to review EPA
promulgation of air quality plan "may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit. .. ").
52. See Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968) (preclusion of review based on repeated judicial
construction of REA, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970), and failure of Congress to
override such interpretation); Western Pac. R.R. v. Habermeyer, 382 F.2d 1003, 1009
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 980 (1968) (no express denial of review but
provisions of Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 355 (1970) construed
in toto said to manifest intent to preclude review). In Western Pacific, while conceding
that the rule of Abbott Laboratories is that "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review," the court nonetheless held that the statute did preclude review despite
the lack of express language of preclusion. 382 F.2d at 1007, quoting 387 U.S. at 141.
Its holding is thus an implicit rejection of the strict "on its face" requirement in Abbott
Laboratories. 387 U.S. at 140 n.2. In Alabama Power (1968), on the other hand, the
court failed even to mention the 1967 Abbott Laboratories decision.
53. 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Petitioner, a consumer group, sought judicial
review of the FTC's refusal to order corrective advertising by a baking firm found to
have misrepresented its product's nutritional value. Although the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (FTCA) guarantees that parties subjected to FTC cease and desist orders
shall be entitled to judicial review, it says nothing denying or providing a right of review
to aggrieved persons outside that category. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
55. 515 F.2d at 373. While the court cites Abbott Laboratories, it does not make
reference to the "upon its face" language. Id. at 370.
56. Section 5(c) of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970), provides: "Any person,
partnership, or corporation required by an order of the [Federal Trade] Commission to
cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a
review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States .
57. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
58. The court based its finding of preclusion on the legislative history behind the
APA STATUTORY PRECLUSION
The Supreme Court itself, in Dunlop v. Bachowski,59 indicated
that, although it held the administrative action in question reviewable,
it had listened to arguments that the legislative history showed "a con-
gressional meaning to prohibit judicial review . . ." and had simply
found the argument unsupported by the legislative record. 0 While
clearly dictum, the statement does suggest that the Court might well
have held the statute to preclude review had a congressional intent to
do so been evidenced by legislative history.
61
If the statements that review may be precluded only where a stat-
ute "upon its face" so directs were taken literally, it might require that
a court ignore clear and convincing evidence that Congress meant to
prohibit review although it did not so indicate in terms. Yet the ortho-
dox rules of statutory construction recognize that "what is implicit is
as much a part of a statute as what is explicit .... . Even a pro-
FrCA. While not indicated by the court in its opinion, the FTCA had in fact been
construed some years earlier to preclude reviewability for anyone not subject to a cease
and desist order. Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. FTC, 277 F. 657 (5th Cir. 1922).
Therefore, an alternative approach to precluding review in Consumer Federation might
have been to observe that the FTCA as judicially interpreted prior to the enactment of
the APA did preclude such review, and that therefore such review was now precluded
under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). An analogous approach was the basis of a holding of
preclusion of review in Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 F.2d 529 (D. C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948).
59. 421 U.S. 560 (1975). The Secretary of Labor had refused to interfere with a
union election as permitted under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. § 481 et seq. (1970), and the disappointed office-seeker sought judicial
review under the APA. 421 U.S. at 563-64. The Supreme Court agreed that review was
not precluded by the statute. Id. at 568. The case is also discussed at note 96 infra.
60. 421 U.S. at 567.
61. Some lower federal decisions also suggest that, if legislative history had shown a
congressional intent to bar review, the result would have been a holding of non-
reviewability. For cases holding agency action reviewable but containing such dicta, see
Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1975) ("clear and convincing
evidence of congressional intent to preclude review expressed in the statute itself or in its
legislative history" sufficient to bar review); Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National
Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ("since there is no explicitness in
the Railway Labor Act or indication in its history of a Congressional intention to leave
it exclusively to Board determination," APA review provisions apply).
At least two members of the Supreme Court who concurred in the result (reviewa-
bility) in both Data Processing and Barlow thought that the question of whether
Congress intended review involved an inquiry beyond the face of the statute itself. See
397 U.S. 159, 173 (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring and dissenting) ("Pertinent
statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations must be examined
to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review, and, if not, whether
Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the class to which the plaintiff belongs.").
62. 4 K. DAVIS, TREATiSE § 28.08, at 37. The point is illustrated by Professor Davis
in his discussion of the landmark pre-APA decision of Switchmen's Union of N. America
v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
The decision rested upon analysis of legislative history, which, according to
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ponent of the "explicit preclusion only" view of nonreviewability has
conceded that no logical differentiation in terms of consequences can
be drawn between explicit and implicit commands of a statute. 3
When the dicta requiring preclusion of review to appear "upon
the face" of a statute are weighed against the earlier holdings of the
Supreme Court in cases such as Ludecke v. Watkins64 and more recent
dicta in Dunlop v. Bachowski, the District of Columbia Circuit appears
to state the law correctly in holding that a statutory "prohibition [of
judicial review] need not be express."'65 It can thus be stated confi-
dently that statutory preclusion of judicial review may be accomplished
by something less than a prohibition appearing on the face of a statute.
Questions remaining are whether the APA mandates a presumption
of review, and if it does, what the strength of any such presumption
is and what indications of congressional intent to preclude review are
required to overcome it.
OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF REVIEWABILITY
The cases interpreting the APA, beginning with Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner,66 uniformly recognize the existence of some sort of
presumption that agency decisions are subject to judicial review. From
the various formulations given by the Supreme Court, it may be gen-
eralized that the APA provides a "strong," but not an irrebuttable, pre-
sumption that judicial review is available to any person aggrieved by
the actions of administrative agencies.6 7
Certain aspects of the presumed availability of judicial review
emerge from the cases as well-settled doctrine. The mere absence
the Court's findings, called for unreviewability. If, as the Court thought, it
was the intent of Congress that the courts should refuse review, then the
statute precluded review, for our whole tradition of statutory interpretation
is that what is implicit is as much a part of a statute as what is explicit, and
that the meaning of a statute includes what courts find through the processes
of interpretation. 4 K. DAvis, TREATiSS § 28.08, at 37.
63. See Jaffe, supra note 20, at 791.
64. 335 U.S. 160 (1948). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
65. Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
66. 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975) ("[the agency] bears
the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to
prohibit all judicial review of [its] decision"); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166
(1970) ("judicial review. . . is the nle, and nonreviewability an exception which must
be demonstrated"); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), quoting
Rusk v. Crt, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1961) ("only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review"); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("judicial
review. . . will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was
the purpose of Congress").
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of a review provision in the organic legislation for a particular agency
is not of itself sufficient to constitute statutory preclusion, and hence
does not overcome the presumption of reviewability. 68 If the affirma-
tive expression of the Congress in the APA that reviewability should be
the norm 9 is to be given effect at all, it ought not be defeated merely
because other legislation does not reiterate that expression.
It is likewise clear that the presumption of reviewability is not
overcome merely by the fact that Congress in a particular agency stat-
ute has expressly provided a right of review for a certain category of
persons and made no mention of other persons who might be aggrieved
by the agency action.70 Nor is the presumption rebutted solely by
the fact that the statute expressly provides the right to review of certain
types of decisions by an agency but makes no mention of review of
other decisions by that agency. 71
Taken together, the cases in this area show clearly that the pre-
sumed availability of review will not be defeated by any demonstration
that Congress was simply passive or oblivious to the issue of reviewabil-
ity of a particular administrative agency's actions. If the specific stat-
ute creating an agency merely omits or ignores the reviewability of cer-
tain agency decisions or for certain categories of aggrieved persons,
68. "Clearly the absence of statutory language expressly authorizing judicial review
is insufficient to offset the presumption that administrative action is reviewable." Hayes
Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 259 (5th Cir. 1975); see Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970), quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946) ('The mere failure to provide specially
by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.").
69. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970) (quoted at note 1 supra).
70. Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 370 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(dictum); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 735-36 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Peoples v. USDA, 427 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Finch, the court
stated: 'The fact that the (Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (1970)] explicitly gave
judicial review to the states and said nothing about welfare recipients is not 'clear and
convincing evidence' that Congress intended to deny review to the primary beneficiaries
under the statute." 429 F.2d at 736. Similarly, in Peoples, the court noted that
although the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2022 (1970), specifically provided a right of
review to blacklisted food distributors, "no .. .implication [of an intent] to curtail or
negative the judicial review otherwise presumed to be available for the protection of the
poor" could be discerned. 427 F.2d at 565.
71. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) ('The mere fact that
some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion
as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and
indeterminate evidence of legislative intent." (citation omitted)); see Aquavella v.
Richardson, 437 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1971) (fact that Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ff(c) (1970), expressly provides for review of certain HEW actions does not show
"Congress intended to have no other determinations reviewed").
Vol. 1976:431]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
then, the cases show, the courts will look to the APA -to fill the void;
its presumption of reviewability stands undisturbed. 72
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the situation where the
presumption of reviewability is obviously displaced. It is evident from
the cases that express statutory preclusion will serve to make judicial
review unavailable. For example, a statute specifying that no court
shall have power or jurisdiction to review any Veterans Administration
decision on claims for benefits73 was held to bar judicial review of the
Administrator's decision on entitlement to a soldier's death gratuity.74
Similarly, judicial review of denial of a death benefit was held pre-
cluded by a statute75 making such decisions "not subject to review...
by any court by mandamus or otherwise. . . .,6 Such express statu-
tory commands are quite clearly "statutes precluding" review and
hence eliminate the otherwise available APA review.7't
But, as previously discussed,7 8 it is not necessary that the congres-
sional intent to preclude review appear expressly in a statute in order
to bar judicial review. It is in this middle ground-where a statute
is facially neutral toward the question of judicial review but where Con-
72. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). Finding that "there is not even
the slightest intimation that Congress gave thought to the matter of the preclusion of
judicial review," id. at 567, the Court in Dunlop held that "§§ 702 and 704 [of the APA]
subject the Secretary's decision to judicial review. . . ." Id. at 566.
73. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970), formerly 38 U.S.C. § lla-2 (1952).
74. Ford v. United States, 230 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1956) (per curiam). The court
found that the "categorical declaration" of the statute that agency decisions on all
questions of law or fact concerning VA benefits claims were final and "beyond the power
of any court to review" was clearly sufficient to preclude review under the APA. Id. at
534.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1970), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 793 (1952).
76. Blanc v. United States, 244 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 874 (1957). Following the final administrative denial of the claim by a postal
worker's widow for benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, the widow
sought judicial review of the agency proceedings under the APA. The court held that
APA review was "expressly and clearly prohibited" by the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b),
which provided that such decisions were not subject to review by any court. 244 F.2d at
710.
77. But cf. Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In Wellman, the
court held a statute providing that "the decisions of the Administrator on any question of
law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law administered by
the Veterans Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any
court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision,"
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964) (emphasis added), did not preclude review of an administra-
tive decision terminating benefits. Congress amended the statute to clarify the express
preclusion intended. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970). See generally W. GELLHORN
& C. BvsE, supra note 20, at 223.
78. See text accompanying notes 35-65 supra.
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gress arguably intended to preclude such review-that the vitality of
the reviewability presumption is tested.
Before considering the judicial treatment of the question in spe-
cific cases arising under the APA, it seems appropriate to look first
at the APA itself. Section 10(a) of the Act grants the right of judicial
review to any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency ac-
tion."79  Section 10(c) goes on to provide that "final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to ju-
dicial review."8  In a mechanical sense, these provisions may be
viewed as a statement of the statutory norm (or presumption) that
agency actions are reviewable. The exceptions listed in the introduc-
tory clause of section 10, one of which is the preclusion-by-statute ex-
ception,81 are the legislative enumeration of what will exempt a specific
agency decision from that statutory norm (or overcome the presump-
tion of reviewability). 82  It is of central importance, then, to determine
what Congress meant by the phrase "statutes preclude" as it is used
in the introductory clause.83
An obvious starting point is to look at the plain meaning of the
word "statutes."8 4 In the common sense of the word, "statutes" de-
rives meaning through the normal process of interpretation by the judi-
ciary.85 Unless Congress meant to attach some unusual significance
to the word "statutes" when it enacted the APA, then, "statutes" is but
shorthand for the legislative expression of intent, which must be di-
vined by the entire arsenal of aids to construction.8 6 As already dis-
cussed, the weight of the APA's own legislative history shows that Con-
gress did not attach any unusual significance to the concept of statutory
preclusion; 7 the contemporary understanding was that Switchmen's
79. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
80. Id. § 704.
81. Id. §701(a) (1) (quoted in note 4 supra).
82. The Supreme Court used essentially this approach in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 566-67 (1975). Accord, Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (APA judicial review provisions apply except as
modified by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970)); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970)
(APA allows judicial review except as limited by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970)).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
84. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) ("the words of statutes...
should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses").
85. See 4 K. DAvis, TREATsE § 28.08, at 37.
86. Among the commonly employed aids to statutory construction are the various
canons concerning surplusage, expressio unius, plain meaning, legislative preambles
and recitals, amendments during passage, debates, and legislative committee reports. See
generally 82 CJ.S. Statutes §§ 345-51 (1953).
87. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
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Union of North America v. National Mediation Board88 typified such
statutory preclusion.8 9  A straightforward view of the APA thus sug-
gests that, in keeping with the Switchmen's Union principle, the rule
that judicial review is unavailable "to the extent statutes preclude it"
means simply that where a statute as judicially construed (whether from
its text, its legislative history, its preamble, or other indicia of congres-
sional purpose) bars review, judicial review is unavailable.9 0
The mainstream of case law decided since the APA's enactment
demonstrates that in fact the courts have continued the pre-APA ap-
proach to reviewability with one possible shift of emphasis. Under
the pre-APA "common law of judicial review,"9' at least before 1920,
a statute wholly neutral on the question of reviewability, both in its
terms and in its background (such as the legislative history), might be
construed as prohibiting judicial review; Congress by its silence would
be seen as hostile to review.92 Now, under the APA, in the situation
where Congress is entirely silent about the question of judicial review,
the APA itself acts as a grant of reviewability 9 3  Except for this possi-
ble modification, however, it seems that the APA continues the earlier
approach illustrated by Switchmen's Union.
Thus, where it is persuasively shown 4 that Congress, by a particu-
lar statute, intended to withhold or foreclose review of an agency de-
cision,95 wholly or by certain persons, the presumption of reviewability
88. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
89. See note 18 supra and accompanying text
90. See 4 K. DAvis, TREATIsE § 28.08, at 41.
91. See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
92. See Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 306 (1911) (army officer discharged for
disability by military tribunal had no right to judicial review of the tribunal's decision).
"If it had been the intention of Congress to give to an officer the right to raise issues and
controversies with the board... and carry them over the head of the President to the
courts, and there litigated, it may be . . . such intention would have been explicitly
declared." Id. The argument that this early "common law" presumption against
reviewability, in the absence of any legislative expression for or against such review, had
been weakened and indeed reversed even prior to the APA, is fully developed by
Professor Davis. 4 K. DAVIs, TRE-ATsB § 28.07, at 30-31.
93. See cases cited in notes 68 & 72 supra.
94. Since the relative strength of the presumption has been variously phrased, see
note 67 supra, no precise characterization of the required counter-showing can profitably
be made. The weight assigned to any given demonstration of congressional intent is
inherently subjective. At the expense of precision, it appears that the terms 'convincing'
or 'persuasive' describe the showing of congressional intent to preclude review which will
be adequate to overcome the presumption of reviewability.
95. In two particular situations the courtt have placed greater emphasis on the
presumption of reviewability and required a correspondingly stronger showing of intent
to bar review in order to overcome the presumption. First, "where agency action is
challenged as a denial of due process, it is 'immune from judicial review, if ever, only by
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created by the APA is overcome. 8 That congressional intent may be
found from various indicia.
Evidence of legislative intent to preclude judicial review may be
textual: the express language of the statute may provide that a certain
administrative decision shall not be subject to any form of review by
the plainest manifestation of congressional intent to that effect." Aquavella v. Richard-
son, 437 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted) (Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395 (1970), did not preclude judicial review of HEW decision to withhold reimburse-
ment for services provided by nursing home); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1429
(1970), did not preclude judicial review of the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to
allow debarment of a contractor from the program, allegedly without due process);
Americana Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. I1. 1975)
(Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970), does not preclude judicial review of HEW
"reasonable cost determination" allegedly made in violation of due process).
Second, section 12 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970), provides that "a subsequent
statute may not be held to supersede or modify... chapter 7 [Judicial Review] ...
except to the extent that it does so expressly." Surprisingly, few of the decisions
concerning statutory preclusion of judicial review by post-1946 legislation have consid-
ered this requirement. In two cases dealing with the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1970), the Supreme Court did place emphasis on section
12. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), held that an alien was not precluded
from having judicial review of a deportation order, despite the fact that the statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) made the Attorney General's deportation decisions "final" and despite
the fact that the Court had in Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), construed similar
language in the Immigration Act of 1917 to bar such review. Shaughnessy distinguished
Heikkila by noting that Shaughnessy involved the 1952 Act, enacted subsequent to the
APA, and by deciding that in the 1952 Act "there is no language which 'expressly'
supersedes or modifies the expanded right of review granted by § 10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act." 349 U.S. at 51. The Shaughnessy opinion adds that the purpose of
the APA in sections 10 and 12 "was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency
action under subsequently enacted statutes. . . ." Id. In Brownell v. We Shung, 352
U.S. 180 (1956), the Court decided that an alien was not precluded from judicial review
of an exclusion order, despite the fact that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) made exclusion decisions
of the Immigration Service officers "final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney
General." 352 U.S. at 184. The Court stressed that this provision was enacted
subsequent to the APA and that "unless made by clear language or supersedure the
expanded mode of review granted by [the APA] cannot be modified." Id. at 185.
It is surprising that the courts have not used the "express modification" requirement
of section 12 more often to counter agency arguments that statutes enacted subsequent to
the APA preclude review of their decisions, given the precedents of Shaughnessy and
Brownell.
96. See Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(discussed at text accompanying notes 53-58 supra); cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S.
560, 567 (1975) (by implication). In rejecting the Secretary of Labor's contention that
his decision under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970) (discussed more fully at note 59 supra) should be unreviewable
because of preclusion by the statute, the Dunlop Court noted:
The Secretary urges that the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives,
its legislative history, the nature of the administrative action involved, and
the conditions spelled out with respect thereto, combine to evince a con-
gressional meaning to prohibit judicial review of his decision. We have ex-
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the courts.0 7  As discussed earlier, such express preclusion is common
in the area of federal employee benefit payments.98
The congressional intent may also be shown by acquiescence in
a long tradition of judicial construction barring review.99 In such situa-
tions, the statute precludes review because Congress has not seen fit
to disturb "the impressive gloss of history" that previously made the
administrative decision unreviewable by the courts. 100 For instance,
one court found that a statute precluded review under the APA without
even looking at the statute itself; "since the Supreme Court had de-
cided [before the APA was enacted] that the Railway Labor Act pre-
cludes judicial review, the [APA] leaves the situation unchanged."''1 1
In addition, an intent to preclude review could arguably be found
in the pattern of a particular statutory scheme. 02 Thus, a statute
which enumerates a right of review for a certain type of agency action
and indicates by language of exclusivity that only that action shall be
reviewable may be interpreted to preclude review.' 3
amined the materials .... They do not reveal to us any congressional
purpose to prohibit judicial review. Indeed, there is not even the slightest
intimation that Congress gave thought to the matter of the preclusion of ju-
dicial review. 421 U.S. at 567 (citation omitted).
The Court implies, by not dismissing the argument without first examining the legislative
background materials, that had the materials provided a convincing showing that
Congress intended to preclude review, the result might well have been a holding of
unreviewability. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
97. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492
(1955) (15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970) precludes review of FPC orders by parties prior to
seeking FPC rehearing); Blanc v. United States, 244 F.2d 708, 710 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957) (5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1970) bars review of Labor
Secretary's denial of death benefit claim); Ford v. United States, 230 F.2d 533, 534 (5th
Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) precludes review of VA award of
soldier's death gratuity); Feldman v. Local Board, 239 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (50 U.S.C. App. § 463(b) (1970) is statute precluding judicial review under APA
of draft board decisions).
98. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
99. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 163 (1948) (discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 21-24 supra); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d
672, 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968) (preclusion of review based on
repeated judicial construction of Rural Electrification Act and failure of Congress to
override such interpretation).
100. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1948).
101. Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 F.2d 529, 530 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1949).
102. This approach was followed in Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 304-06 (1943), and thus arguably could be utilized by a
court to determine whether a statute was one which precludes review under the APA. See
note 18 supra and accompanying text.
103. Dickson v. Edwards, 293 F.2d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1961) (Soil Bank Act, 7
U.S.C. § 1831 (1970), barred the review sought because "only one decision was made
subject to judicial review and as to that the statute carefully fenced it in").
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Finally, that Congress had the purpose of prohibiting review
when it enacted a particular statute may be shown by reference to the
underlying legislative history.10 4  If a persuasive showing is made that
it was the understanding of the sponsoring legislators and the commit-
tees which favorably reported a bill that it would limit the availability
of judicial review, then the statute will be construed to preclude review.
The court in Consumer Federation of America v. FTC °0 quoted ex-
tensively from congressional debates which preceded the FTCA's en-
actment and concluded that the legislative history of the statute "pre-
sents clear and convincing evidence of a legislative intent" to preclude
all review of FTC cease and desist orders except when sought by par-
ties subject to the orders.108
CONCLUSION
Under the APA, as under the "common law" approach which pre-
ceded its enactment, the availability of judicial review as an avenue of
relief for persons aggrieved by the actions of federal administrative
agencies is a question which will be answered by judicial determination
of whether Congress intended such judicial review. The chief signifi-
cance of the APA in the area of reviewability is that it provides a pre-
sumption that Congress did intend to make review available unless
convincing evidence of a contrary congressional purpose is demon-
strated, thereby eliminating the possibility that a court might construe
the mere omissions by Congress of any provision for judicial review
of certain agency decisions or upon petition by certain parties as being
itself a manifestation of the intent to prohibit review. But the APA
makes clear that the review which is ordinarily presumed to be avail-
able is barred "to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review."'10 7
Statutes may preclude review by express prohibition, or they may be
judicially construed to preclude review, whenever persuasive evidence
that Congress intended to limit judicial review is found in any of the
sources traditionally utilized for statutory construction.
104. Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC, 515 F.2d 367, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see
Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum) ("clear and
convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude review expressed in the statute
itself or in its legislative history would be sufficient to bar review); Air Line Dispatchers
Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (dictum) (APA
review available because Railway Labor Act did not explicitly or in its history indicate
congressional intent to make the National Mediation Board decision unreviewable).
105. 515 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussed at notes 53-58 supra and accompany-
ing text).
106. Id. at 370-73.
107. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
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